Commission for Global CoordinationGlobal Secretariat · Established 2041
Artificial
Governance
A common framework.
A continuous mandate.
Open study series / Governance

Delegation: borrowing attention without surrendering agency

Delegation can let people contribute their knowledge while sharing the work of participation. Clear scope, usable revocation and visible responsibility can make representation a service that members continue to control.

What this could make possible

Share attention without giving up your place

Imagine choosing someone you trust to follow water engineering decisions while keeping your own vote on neighbourhood access. You can see where your authority goes, return to direct participation and withdraw a mandate when circumstances change.

Treat attention as a shared practical problem

Liquid democracy allows direct voting or delegation to another person; some versions allow further delegation. Gölz, Kahng, Mackenzie and Procaccia's 2018 research examines how influence can concentrate and how multiple delegation options might distribute it more evenly. The motivating opportunity remains attractive: a person should be able to rely on someone else's expertise without studying every question from the beginning. A well-designed arrangement could let a nurse contribute knowledge about health, a technician about maintenance and a resident about local access. Their contribution would support other members' decisions while preserving ways to question the advice.

Inside the Commission

The Commission's continuous delegation standard treats an incomplete transfer as confidence and makes a replacement necessary before an existing mandate can end. Residents are formally covered while losing an effective way to withdraw authority. A different arrangement could make delegation revocable, limited to a subject and time-bound. It would still need to handle people who do not participate, delegates who stop responding and chains whose final recipient is difficult to identify. A visible revocation button is only useful if the underlying rules actually honour it.

Let delegation follow the question

Democracy Earth's 2017 Social Smart Contract explores borderless participation and liquid democracy, including delegation by topic. It is a proposal whose wider ambitions remain questions for investigation. For a possible basin arrangement, a resident might delegate technical maintenance decisions for three months while voting directly on access priorities. The scope would name the subject, duration and any permission to delegate onward. A useful interface would show the final recipient of authority before the resident confirms. This could make expertise easier to share while allowing a person to remain actively involved in decisions where their own experience matters most.

Reading behind this discussionThe Social Smart Contract

Make the right to withdraw straightforward

Our illustrative design would allow a resident to revoke a delegation without appointing a replacement. The system would explain whether that leaves the person voting directly or abstaining, and when the change takes effect. A withdrawal could affect future ballots without pretending to undo every completed decision. Advance notice of an important vote would give members a chance to return and take part themselves. Assisted and offline routes would serve people unable to use the usual interface. The benefit is continuing consent: trust can develop through experience because it does not require an indefinite commitment at the start.

Look at the people who shape the choices

Jo Freeman's essay on structurelessness argues that informal power persists when groups decline to acknowledge their structure. Applying it to digital governance is an analogy from a different movement context. It prompts us to look beyond the final vote. In the basin experiment, the people writing proposals, selecting evidence and setting meeting times would explain their roles as well as the delegates casting ballots. Training, shared documentation and rotation of manageable responsibilities could help more members learn those tasks. Expertise would remain valuable, while its holders could help others become capable participants instead of becoming indispensable gatekeepers.

Reading behind this discussionThe Tyranny of Structurelessness

Write a mandate people can actually use

CommunityRule offers templates for making an organisation's governance choices explicit and editable. A small group could use that approach to draft a delegation agreement in ordinary language. Our suggested agreement would say what the delegate may decide, what they must report, how members can contact them and what ends the mandate. Members could choose to require reasons for consequential votes and disclosure of relevant conflicts. The document should be short enough to consult during a disagreement. Writing it together can reveal incompatible expectations early, when clarifying them is easier than repairing a relationship after a disputed decision.

Reading behind this discussionCommunityRule templates

Test whether representation gives people time back

Try the arrangement with a limited set of decisions and review it after several meetings. Ask whether members understand who represents them, whether questions receive answers and whether withdrawing authority works in practice. Inspect concentration alongside useful expertise: a popular delegate may be trusted for good reasons, yet still need limits and support. Invite less active members to describe what would make participation manageable. The goal is a relationship in which people can stay informed without staying constantly online. A successful design would make returning, disagreeing and changing one's representative ordinary parts of membership.

What would let you trust a delegate with your attention while keeping an effective way to disagree, return and withdraw?
Your experiment / Delegation

Borrow expertise. Keep your voice.

Change the withdrawal rule and the amount of delegated authority. See how much returns to its original holders and whether one representative retains a majority.

Open this experiment